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Abstract
This paper investigates South Africa’s participation in the BRICS formation and the implications
of its inclusion for the country, the continent, and global governance. It argues that by joining the
BRICS grouping, South Africa is reinforcing neoliberalism in Africa, with markets being
liberalized across the continent, trade and investment becoming the focus, and social and
environmental protection remaining a distant concern. Meanwhile, other countries, particularly
China and Russia, are instrumentalizing the forum to get what they want out of African countries
without formalizing the grouping’s policies and effecting change to global institutions at the
global level, as was initially promised. The paper applies the concept of soft balancing strategy
to demonstrate that the BRICS grouping is an economic cooperation forum, not a political
cooperation forum, which explains the aforementioned consequences.
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South Africa has become an active participant in the current period of transition in the
global balance of power and has strategically positioned itself with other emerging powers in
opposition to the traditional powers. South Africa’s membership in the BRICS forum
(comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) entails both opportunities and
challenges for the country, the continent, and global governance. However, it appears that
opportunities for transformation are not being fulfilled; rather, economic positions are being
retrenched in line with neoliberalism, and the BRICS forum is being used for unilateral national
political gain. By joining the BRICS grouping, South Africa is reinforcing neoliberalism in
Africa, with markets being liberalized across the continent, trade and investment becoming the
focus, and social and environmental protection remaining a distant concern. Meanwhile, other
countries, particularly China and Russia, are instrumentalizing the forum to get what they want
out of African countries (namely, oil for China and investment opportunities for Russia) without
formalizing the grouping’s policies and effecting change to global institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as was initially promised. This paper applies the concept of
soft balancing strategy to demonstrate that BRICS is an economic cooperation forum, not a
political cooperation forum, which explains the aforementioned consequences.
As Cornelissen et al. (2012) argued, economic transformations after the global financial
downturn indicate tectonic shifts away from the G-7 countries and toward the BRICS countries
and other countries of the global South. In this context, the recent inclusion of South Africa in
the BRICS grouping, which is committed to reorienting global institutions toward and improving
development prospects for Southern countries, has crucial implications, given South Africa’s
increasingly hegemonic status in Africa. As Alden and Le Pere (2009, p.145) rightly pointed out:
“Public goods and leadership in peace diplomacy, resolving conflicts, and helping to develop the
continent’s institutions collides with the more instrumental aspects relating to investment, its
commercial interests and the material sources of its hegemony.”
The concept of soft balancing strategy is analytically useful in assessing South Africa’s
participation in BRICS and the consequences thereof. Following Flemes (2007), a soft balancing
strategy is an effort to increase the bargaining power of developing countries; cooperation
between them “equally focuses on concrete collaboration areas,” such as trade, security,
infrastructure, and representation. Groupings of countries can “be characterized [not only] as …
a strategic alliance for the pursuit of common interests of developing countries in global
institutions but also as a platform for [multilateral] and interregional South-South cooperation.”
With a soft balancing strategy, the key concepts are sector cooperation, common interests, and
foreign policy instruments. This paper applies these concepts to the BRICS grouping to assess
South Africa’s participation in the group and the consequences thereof.
While South Africa is presented with many challenges on the African continent, its
ability to exert influence over its neighboring countries has strengthened its development as a
rising regional hegemon. First, it maintains a position of economic leadership in sub-Saharan
Africa; South Africa is the only country on the continent that makes its replenishment
contributions to the World Bank’s International Development Association, which provides
concessional loans to the poorest countries. It is the third-largest shareholder of the African
Development Bank—behind only the United States and Japan. It is the only African donor for
the African Development Fund and is the largest donor for the South African Development
Community (SADC) (Besharati, 2013). Second, South Africa presides as an African leader in the
international political sphere. Its position in the Group of Twenty (G-20), African Union (AU),
SADC, and BRICS—among others—provides multiple frameworks through which the South
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African government has lobbied and continues to lobby for African interests. Third, throughout
Africa, the country provides development assistance as a leader of and significant contributor to
multilateral peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and institutional capacity building
during post-conflict reconstruction. Significantly, South Africa, along with Egypt and Nigeria,
has become the most significant African contributor to the peacekeeping operations conducted
by the AU and United Nations (UN) (Beshrati, 2013). Finally, the country remains a hub of
technical expertise for the African continent. In light of the debate over aid effectiveness and the
gradual shift towards South-South cooperation models, South Africa is increasingly being
consulted by its neighbors from a technical perspective. Traditional development donors have
acknowledged South Africa’s strengths by funding South-South projects. For example, Canada
funded a triangular development partnership—the Regional Capacity Building (RCB) Project—
between South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, whereby South Africa transferred its
knowledge of building public sector capacities in post-conflict environments to the latter three
countries. For these reasons, South Africa remains a regional hegemon on the continent. Some
cite its recent decline in GDP growth—listed as a bottom five performer between 2008 and 2012
(UN Economic Report on Africa, 2013)—and the rise of regional contenders, such as Nigeria, as
evidence to the contrary; however, for the time being at least, it seems South Africa will continue
to exert its influence over the African continent.
At the outset, it is important to understand that South Africa’s increasingly hegemonic
status does not exist in a vacuum. Alden and La Pere (2009) identified three different
mechanisms that have created hegemonic layering: South Africa vs. South African Customs
Union, South Africa vs. SADC and, finally, South Africa vs. the African continent. Domestically
and internationally, these layers of hegemonic relationships restructure the established patterns of
power balances pertaining to the role of South Africa in the region. With South Africa’s
inclusion in BRICS, the grouping has become an external influence on South Africa’s
hegemony, simultaneously reiterating, bolstering, and constraining it. How South Africa came to
be a member of the grouping is worth outlining to demonstrate this influence and the ambiguous
motives behind it.
Genesis of BRICS
The original BRICS bloc began to form in 2006, when foreign ministers of Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (BRIC) began conducting political dialogue. This informal grouping
crystalized on June 16, 2009, with the first summit. South Africa was shortly granted an
invitation to join the grouping by the existing members on December 23, 2010 by the then
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Yang Jiechi. South Africa’s
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mshabane, made the
announcement after months of lobbying by President Jacob Zuma, who has marketed the country
as a gateway to Africa. Zuma has maintained that the BRICS bloc is an important group of which
to be part given that the emerging economies of its member states have a significant role to play
in restructuring political, economic, and financial institutions to become more equitable and
balanced (Yanshuo, 2011). Participation in the group provides, according to the Government of
South Africa (2012), economic benefits such as increased trade and investment opportunities as
well as political benefits, such as an increased voice in the international sphere.
The third BRIC summit, held in China in April 2011, with the presence of South African
President Jacob Zuma, heralded the transformation of the BRIC grouping to BRICS. The
countries together called for reforms to international financial mechanisms and greater
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cooperation in fields including finance, business, science, and technology. South African Trade
and Industry Minister Rob Davies indicated that the five BRICS countries would benefit from
direct trade in their own currencies since such trade would protect them from volatile
international convertible currencies, namely the US dollar (SAinfo, 2011). The countries’
development banks signed a framework agreement on cooperation that established mutual credit
lines through their respective national financial development institutions to be denominated in
local currencies. The China Development Bank was the first institution to respond to the new
measures, outlining its intention to lend 10 billion Yuan (US$ 1.6 billion) to Brazil, Russia,
India, and South Africa. There is no information yet on the precise terms of the loan or precisely
how the money will be allocated or to which projects, but the loans are likely to focus on large
oil and natural gas projects (Xin and Blanchard, 2011).
This first BRICS meeting with South Africa concluded with the signing of the Sanya
Declaration, outlining the major commitments and areas of agreement discussed at the summit.
Among them were (i) the development of a broad-based reserve currency system that provides
stability and certainty, (ii) a discussion about the global role of special drawing rights (SDRs),
the IMF’s accounting unit, and the SDRs’ basket of currencies (now comprising the US dollar,
the euro, yen and pound sterling), (iii) the establishment of mutual credit lines denominated in
the member states’ home currencies by the state development banks of the group, (iv) the reform
of international institutions such as the IMF and United Nations Security Council to reflect the
interests of emerging and developing countries, (v) the importance of renewable energies and
atomic energy technologies as key elements for development, (vi) the intention to reduce the
distortion of and further regulate the financial market, (vii) and the expansion and deepening of
economic, trade and investment cooperation among BRICS countries (Xinhua, Sanya
Declaration, April 14, 2011).
The latest BRICS summit was hosted on 27 March, 2013 in Durban, South Africa. It
picked up on themes from previous summits, including fleshing out the plan for the creation of a
New Development Bank, focused primarily on financing infrastructure projects. The 2013
summit also marked a significant opportunity for South Africa to begin make its mark on this
grouping. South Africa outlined its own strategic value to the group by highlighting its
investment in expanding railways, ports, and fuel pipelines for the sake of “unlocking the
world’s greatest mineral wealth” (BRICS Summit, South Africa in BRICS). The demand for
these commodities can help fuel growth not only on the African continent but also among South
Africa’s partner countries in the BRICS grouping, who, if they want to continue their exceptional
growth trajectory, will be in need of increasing amounts of natural resources.
BRICS: A Forum for Politics or Economics?
Given current patterns of economic growth, the BRICS forum could become a global
political force and influence international policy making—but only if the members are able to
generate consensus on key global issues. Commentators argue that the BRICS group could
become an alternative force that could help to shape global security and governance architectures
and present an alternative to NATO (Haibin, 2012). Peace and security matters, particularly in
developing countries, could be better addressed in forums such as BRICS. However, for BRICS
to become such a political force, the BRICS nations would have to display more evidence of
cooperation and coordination beyond signing economic and political cooperation agreements.
Although some analysts contend that the forum is, by nature, a political rather than an economic
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forum (and that as such, it is not expected to significantly economically impact African countries
in the short to medium term) (van den Bosch, 2011), what it is clear is that BRICS is not a formal
alliance bloc of politically like-minded countries but is, in fact, an alliance among rivals in
international markets, attempting to meet their own national interests. BRICS members do,
however, have similar objectives, namely economic growth and a desire to reform international
institutions to better represent emerging economies (White, 2011).
Many South African analysts assert that the BRICS nations could, together, play a
political role to counteract the Western countries and allow for developing countries to have a
greater voice in international institutions by (i) increasing the likelihood that leaders are chosen
from outside of the Western countries, (ii) trading in currency other than the US dollar, (iii)
increasing financial regulation and (iv) establishing a stable, reliable, and broad-based
international reserve currency system. In reality, however, with such divergent national interests
and objectives, politics could obscure the ability of the group to become a real force in global
decision-making. As recently as August 2010, BRICS failed to unite to work toward their
objective of changing the leadership of global institutions. In the first BRICS meeting in April
2011, the BRICS countries declared that the next chair of the IMF should be selected not based
on region but according to competence, marking the first time that a group of developing
countries have pressured a leading international organization to select a chief executive who
accurately reflects emerging global realties and the rising importance of the emerging economies
(Battersby and Lu, 2011), but when faced with the opportunity to unite behind one candidate
from the global South for the position of managing director of the IMF, the BRICS countries
failed to reach consensus. With the resignation of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Southern candidates
such as South African National Planning Minister Trevor Manuel were publicly endorsed as
contenders, but the original BRIC members were content to support and endorse French nominee
Christine Lagarde over any candidate from the South. This lack of cohesion does not bode well
for the ability of the five countries to provide a united front against the developed states’
dominance of global institutions (Naidu, forthcoming).
South Africa within BRICS
There is little consensus regarding the reasons for and implications of South Africa’s
admittance to the group. The invitation of South Africa was met by surprise by many analysts,
who were puzzled by the admittance of a relatively small economy to the BRICS formation,
particularly given that there were many apparently stronger contenders, such as Mexico, South
Korea, and Turkey. There has been widespread speculation about the nature of the association
between South Africa and the four original BRIC member nations, including about the possible
motivations behind the invitation itself (be they economic or political) and what the inclusion of
South Africa will mean for BRICS as well as what effect South Africa’s membership within
BRICS will have on South Africa itself and on the African continent as a whole.
Some observers contend that it is difficult to immediately perceive how South Africa
could easily fit into the BRIC group (Khan, 2011). The country’s inclusion changes the dynamics
of a group that had previously consistently impacted global economic markets and is estimated
by Goldman Sachs to have contributed to over one-third of all global growth in gross domestic
product (GDP) over the past decade (Wilson, Kelston and Ahmed, 2010). With a GDP
approximately one-sixteenth of China’s output and a population of only 50 million (compared to
China’s 1.3 billion and India’s 1.2 billion), South Africa has significantly less economic power
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than the other members (World Bank, n.d.). In addition, South Africa has a nominal GDP of
$US384.3 billion, far below that of the others: Brazil ($2.3 trillion), India ($1.8 trillion), Russia
($2.0 trillion), and China ($8.2 trillion) (World Bank, n.d.). South Africa’s economy is not even
included in The Economist’s ranking of the 10 fastest-growing2 economies between 2011–15,
seven of which are located in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), whereas China and India are ranked as
the top two (The Economist, 2011). The country has also not achieved improvements in living
standards or sustained levels of economic growth or job growth, all of which are characteristic of
the original BRIC countries (Andreasson, 2011).
Despite an economic presence far below that of the other BRIC members, South Africa
has a per capita income that is higher than those of both China and India3 and one of the highest
ratios of market capitalization in the world (White, 2011). According to Martins (2011), South
Africa enters the group not as a middle-income country but as the most powerful economy on a
fast-growing continent. To President Zuma, South Africa’s participation in the BRICS group
means that the entire continent of Africa, with a population of over 1 billion, is now represented
in the grouping (Wong, 2010). Trade and Industry Minister Davies explained that the country’s
membership in the grouping is linked to the continent’s economic status: “The African continent
is the next great economic story. [South Africa is] quite small, but when we look at the African
continent as a whole, the numbers start to add up” (Van den Bosch, 2011), implying that there
may yet be some logic to the inclusion of such a relatively small economy among the more
apparently powerful members of the BRICS formation.
South Africa has a two-tiered economy. On the one hand, it is Africa’s economic
powerhouse, with a GDP averaging around 25 percent of the entire continent’s GDP. South
Africa’s formal sector, based on services, mining, and manufacturing, can rival those of the
majority of those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
states. As a middle-income country, with a per capita gross national income (GNI) of US$7,610,4
South Africa’s largely affluent white population has long reaped the benefits of controlling a
competitive and robust economy characterized by an abundant supply of mineral resources; welldeveloped legal, energy, financial, communications, and transportation sectors; modern
infrastructure that supports an efficient distribution of goods and services to major urban centers
throughout the country; and an active stock exchange that ranks among the top 20 in the world.
On the other hand, South Africa is also a country plagued by pervasive poverty, high
unemployment, and severe inequalities. The OECD’s 2010 Economic Survey of South Africa
outlines several concerns about the economy that remain issues in its 2013 report: high levels of
continued unemployment,5 growing dualism in labor markets, and low levels of
entrepreneurialism among the black population (OECD, 2010). The 2013 report also raised
concern over the quality of education (OECD, 2013).
Benefits and Risks of South Africa’s Inclusion in BRICS
Much has been made of both the potential economic benefits for South Africa by
becoming a member of BRICS as well as the benefits to the original four members of the
introduction of an African member. Some view South Africa’s membership within BRICS as
inherently positive, an opportunity to influence policy making and alignment among developing
countries to make the international economic system more inclusive (Martins, 2011). This is
largely due to the assumption that South Africa will be a representative of the African
continent’s interests. To others, however, South Africa is a lightweight in the global economic
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arena in comparison to the other BRIC members and, despite its trading relationship with China,
its membership in the group is unlikely to significantly benefit the other members (Oxford
Analytica, 2011). Despite such pessimism, South Africa’s membership in the group is projected
to allow the country to promote economic development through enhanced trade and investment
and expand sectors in which the country already holds a comparative advantage (Martins, 2011)
as well as provide overseas investment opportunities for South African enterprises (Chun, 2011).
In terms of African development, Chun (2011) considers the BRICS grouping to be beneficial
for expansion of SSA markets, infrastructural development, and trilateral cooperation on the
continent. For other BRICS member nations, the benefits of having South Africa in the group
include (a) greater representation among developing countries and, perhaps most significantly,
(b) increased access to African markets. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang stated that the inclusion
of South Africa in the group would promote development among the members and further
cooperation among emerging economies (Dubbelman, 2011). While it is not yet clear whether
South Africa’s entrance into the forum will help promote such development or facilitate such
cooperation, it is evident that a number of risks are associated with its entrance in the group –
both economic and political. Questions have arisen over the wisdom of South Africa joining such
an exclusive “club” that could potentially entrench the differences in economic size and power
between it and the other members (Besada & Tok and Winters, 2013).
Economic Implications
Applying the concept of soft balancing, it is evident that in the economic dimension,
there are efforts to strengthen the BRICS countries internally in order to support development
and reaffirm the economic weight of the BRICS countries, collectively. Among the challenges of
achieving both internal economic growth within member nations and increasing the economic
leverage of the BRICS collective as a whole is not to retrench differences in economic size and
power among the BRICS members. A key instrument for avoiding such a pitfall is emerging the
BRICS development bank, which would shift power towards the BRICS group itself (and away
from individual member nations in particular). An additional threat to the strengthening of the
BRICS economic influence is that “less ambitious” cooperation is occurring, with an emphasis
being placed on South-South trade and joint projects as opposed to on increased commercial
interaction between the global North and South.
Development bank. The proposed BRICS development bank, which could start in 2015,
is meant to promote joint investment initiatives and conduct transactions in the local currencies
of the BRICS nations, shifting power away from the West (Bracht, 2013). Despite their
intentions to unify and effectively leverage their collective economic power, however, the
BRICS countries themselves are having difficulty reaching agreement on the particulars of the
proposed bank, including where the start-up capital will come from, where it will be located,
who will staff it, and to whom it will lend money (Bracht, 2013). The countries’ conflicting
interests and the vast differences in their respective economic influence make agreement on
details very challenging. Recent trends have also shown that investors are reluctant to buy stocks
from emerging markets because of disappointing economic growth (Slater, 2013). When
aggregated, such difficulties suggest that predictions of the BRICS grouping as an economic
leveraging entity may be overrated.
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South-South trade. South Africa’s entrance into BRICS represents a shift from earlier
hesitance to join such an entity, expressed by former President Thabo Mbeki as a concern that
entering such a group would ultimately result in the country’s relationship with China (for
example) coming to resemble South Africa’s colonial relationships of the past. He said that
exporting raw materials to China while importing Chinese manufactured goods would condemn
South Africa to underdevelopment and would mean a replication of Africa’s relationship with its
former colonial powers (BBC News, 2006). In response to such concerns about China’s
expanding role in Africa, South African officials have responded that increased competition
between developed and emerging economies is positive (Financial Times, 2010). Nonetheless,
emerging relations between China and Africa have raised concerns, particularly in regards to
China’s underwriting of investments and trade with the Sudanese government, which has been
accused of serious human rights violations (Lee, 2006). Additionally, criticism of Chinese
enterprises on the continent has been widespread; in countries like Algeria, Angola, Zambia, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chinese companies and workers have been targets of
violence and animosity, while international analysts criticize the Chinese government’s
willingness to ignore human rights and governance concerns and the environment in pursuit of
resources (Anderlini, 2010).
Given the current partnership and trading relationship between China and South Africa,
China is set to make the largest impact on the South African landscape. Bilateral trade between
the countries has been gradually expanding since diplomatic relations were established in 1998,
with total trade amounting to $16 billion in 2010, growing 2 percent from 2008 (The Times,
2011). Trade with China has tripled as a share of South Africa’s total trade, from less than five
percent in 2000 to approximately 15 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2011). Major Chinese
companies such as ZTE and Huawei are investing and establishing their African headquarters in
South Africa, and Beijing has located the African headquarters of the China-Africa Development
Fund in Johannesburg. In August 2010, China signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership”
with South Africa in recognition of the growth in bilateral trade between the two countries
(Xinhua, August 24, 2010). The declaration outlined 38 cooperation agreements6 between the
two countries, focusing on trade, investment, mineral exploration, and agriculture as well as
national and global political dialogues (Xinhua, August 24, 2010). The state visit also produced a
plan to build a high-speed rail link between Durban and Johannesburg (Gordhan, 2011).
South Africa has recently also rapidly expanded its involvement in the African continent,
driven by economic liberalization and the lowering of economic barriers in many African
countries. While such economic liberalization has restricted investment opportunities in
traditional sectors (such as petroleum, mining, and construction) for many European and
American enterprises, it has not done so for South Africa; rather, South Africa has been able, as a
result of continent-wide liberalization, to penetrate many other sectors of Africa’s economies.
Indeed, South African’s trade to SSA has risen steadily in the past few years. Only 4 percent of
South Africa’s trade was conducted with SSA in 1990, compared to 12 percent in 2010. This is
in contrast with figures showing that SSA accounts for only 2–5 percent of total trade with China
and Brazil and only 0.2 percent of total Russian trade.7
With South-South trade expected to account for a growing share of global trade, South
Africa’s new status within BRICS could provide new trade and investment opportunities not
only for South Africa but also for other African countries (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013) Most
analysts are unclear whether South Africa will serve as an African representative within BRICS
while also attempting to “leverage” itself as a major player in the group (Bauer, 2011). Currently,
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Asia accounts for the majority of South-South commerce, with figures indicating that China
alone comprises 40 percent of such trade (Aykut and Ratha 2004). A key challenge for South
Africa will therefore be to ensure that other regions of the world can generate a larger portion of
South-South commerce than China currently constitutes.
Joint partnerships. According to South Africa’s government, South Africa’s trade and
investment are poised to expand with the country’s membership in the BRICS association
through the group’s joint ventures and cooperation. The South African government is also
hoping to leverage its membership to secure opportunities for joint ventures, mergers, and
cooperation with other BRIC countries currently investing on the African continent (Gordhan,
2011). In recent years, a number of joint ventures have developed, particularly between Chinese
and South African firms.8 Standard Bank, the largest bank in South Africa, sold 20 percent of the
bank to the International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (Battersby and Lu, 2011) before
South Africa joined the BRICs group. In a joint statement, the ICBC indicated that it views
South Africa as a lucrative market for investment and an alliance between the International
Commercial Bank of China and South Africa’s Standard Bank would open up opportunities for
both countries across the continent (SAInfo, 2007). The deal between the two banks provides the
South African bank with increased access to the largest and fastest growing economy in the
world (China), allowing the bank to better facilitate and finance trade flows between Asia and
Africa (SAInfo, 2007). Since the acquisition, ICBC and Standard Bank have launched
cooperative projects, including major infrastructure projects. In short, South Africa’s
participation in the BRICS group provides strategic investment partnerships for other members,
particularly China. It should be noted that South Africa’s mergers with BRIC firms, however, are
not regarded by all as beneficial for South Africans, as many perceive that such mergers could
allow BRIC investors to exploit the region (van den Bosch, 2011).
Investments. It is not yet clear whether trade between South Africa and the BRIC
countries will expand on a long-term basis, providing tangible benefits for South Africa or the
African continent. It is also difficult to determine whether BRIC investments in South Africa are
occurring as a result of South Africa’s participation in BRICS or whether such investments
would have been made regardless of South Africa’s BRICS membership, considering that
infrastructural development in the region had been increasing even prior to South Africa’s
admittance to the group. It does appear, however, that there has been considerable interest in
forging new investments across BRICS members since the country’s initiation into the BRICS
formation. For example, Since South Africa joined BRICS, an immigration official reported that
in a period of just over a week, there was a 38 percent increase in enquiries from corporate
clients and individuals requesting visas and information on obtaining work permits in BRIC
nations (China Daily, Sept 15, 2011b). The South African government has also encouraged
private investment in BRICS through trade expos. In November 2011, it invited South African
companies in targeted sectors to participate in trade expos in Beijing and Shanghai (China Daily,
Sept 15, 2011a).
Technology. Brazil, Russia, India, and China have increased capacity to bring to Africa
expertise and technologies that can aid infrastructural development. These countries account for
more than 50 percent of overall emerging market IT spending, and, therefore, could provide
opportunities for technology transfer (Reynolds and Andersen, 2010). With higher levels of
technological innovation in the BRIC nations, it is expected that BRICS membership will
provide for South Africa technology sharing, joint manufacturing, marketing and research
projects, and exchange programs for skills and training (D’Angelo, 2011).
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Political Implications
The proliferation of regional integration initiatives and geo-political forums and blocs are
changing the economic and political landscape of global affairs. South Africa is currently a
member of the UN, the G-20, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, the G-77, and a non-permanent
member on the Security Council. Within Africa, it is a member of the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union, and
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). To some analysts, BRICS membership
will allow South Africa to positively contribute to key global governance and democracy issues
and allow the country to demonstrate its leadership on issues such as conflict resolution, security,
and reconstruction and development (Makgetlaneng, 2011).
South African independence in foreign policy making. As mentioned earlier, the
BRICS arrangement poses a problem for South Africa’s foreign policy, as it is not necessarily
aligned with that of the other member nations. This is not, however, a challenge unique to South
Africa. For instance, Russia and China vetoed the UN Security Council resolution on Syria,
while India voted in favor of it. Nevertheless, the group is attempting to move towards unity on
foreign policy issues. In its joint statement on Iran, the BRICS countries stated, “We recognize
Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations and
support resolution of the issues involved by political and diplomatic means and dialogue between
the parties concerned, including between the IAEA and Iran, in accordance with the provisions
of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions” (Ilyashenko, 2012). Many experts and analysts
argue that integration into BRICS causes concern for South Africa’s foreign policy, given that it
may be difficult for the country to justify its foreign policy positions among the other, much
wealthier countries in the forum (OA, 2011) (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013). It is difficult for
all members to reach a consensus, considering their differing national, regional, and strategic
interests. The South African government asserts that its foreign policy priorities are focused on
Africa and that its economic priorities lie in forging greater trade with China and India
(Government of South Africa, 2011). It should be noted, however, that while South African
diplomacy has been focused on conflict resolution and peacekeeping in other African countries
like the DRC and Zimbabwe, the country has done little to promote consensus on key
development concerns, particularly in relation to Asia’s growing economic involvement in
Africa as Africa seeks to gain strategic economic partnerships with Asian enterprises and expand
South African multinationals’ presence into key Asian centers such as China and India. In fact,
South Africa has remained silent in regards to China’s role in Africa, even about controversial
land deals (OA, 2011), choosing instead to prioritize and attract increasing investment in the
continent.
Political unity within BRICS. The cohesiveness of the BRICS forum is also cause for
concern; the economic goals of the member nations, as well as their current objectives and past
and future political alliances9 could potentially conflict. There is clearly potential for friction for
South Africa when it comes to foreign policy objectives with other BRIC countries. Many argue
that there is little in terms of political and economic objectives that bind these countries together
in the first place (OA, 2011). Furthermore, four of the five members are democracies, which may
create future conflict or controversy in terms of political priorities. As such, South Africa’s
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ability to fully participate in the BRICS forum could potentially be constrained by its dearth of
diplomatic resources, compared to those of the other members (OA, 2011).
There has been speculation as to how the admission of South Africa into BRICS will
affect IBSA—the policy forum between India, China, and South Africa established to reach
consensus on a variety of political, economic, and social issues. Some conjecture that the IBSA
partnership will continue to operate within the BRICS group or be absorbed by China and
Russia, particularly if BRICS adopts a more political agenda and is able to speak as a united
group on issues of international importance (Brooks, 2011). This notion is dismissed by others
who argue that there is no evidence to suggest that IBSA will be rendered obsolete and instead
contend that IBSA will help strengthen BRICS (Dubbelman, 2011) and reinforce the work of the
forum through collaboration on investment initiatives and calls for reform of the international
monetary system. With both forums still so early in their formation, however, it is difficult to
predict how they will interact.
Continental impact. Many analysts within South Africa argue that economic growth on
the continent has been constrained due to low levels of regional and continental economic
integration. Some contend that to get the most out of the new BRICS arrangement, South Africa
must push for continued regional integration through regional bodies such as SADC (Davies,
2011). While SADC has made progress in integrating its member economies relative to the other
regional bodies on the continent, increasing the flow of resources and minerals in the region (e.g.
Angolan oil; Tanzanian gold; Zambian copper; and Zimbabwean diamonds, gold, and chrome)
(Kahn, 2011), it has not attained the level of integration it has promoted. It has not made
significant progress along its 15 year plan, according to which it was to reach a Customs Union
in 2010, a Common Market in 2015, a Monetary Union in 2016, and a regional currency in 2018
(in Amos, 2010). South Africa is by far the most dominant economy in the SADC group at both
an economic and political levels (Amos, 2010), though many argue that regional integration has
at times conflicted with South Africa’s national interests and that the country is choosing to
integrate itself into the world economy at the expense of focusing on regional partners (Amos,
2010) (Besada, Tok and Winters, 2013). The agreement between South Africa and the European
Union (the EU/SA Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), which developed a
free trade area between the two partners, is, according to Amos (2010), an example of this.10
Certainly, the BRICS grouping offers political leverage for South Africa with some
advocating it should pursue alliances in key sectors (Kahn, 2011). One of the key sectors in
which South Africa can influence the agenda of the BRICS countries is that of renewable energy.
Through helping to negotiate agreements focussing on trade-offs between environment and
development, South Africa could help to develop its own renewable energy and technology
sectors. Indeed, South Africa has already indicated it will use its membership in the group to
intensify its global campaign on climate change.
Soft power balancing on the global stage. South Africa’s stint as a non-permanent
member on the Security Council from October 2006 to 2008 garnered the country criticism for
its controversial voting including its support for normalization of nuclear trade with India,11 its
opposition to sanctions against Iran12, its helping to block a sanctions resolution against
Zimbabwe's rulers by voting against imposed sanctions,13 and its voting against condemning the
UN human rights violations in by the military junta in Myanmar.14 South Africa’s decisions,
which outraged the international community, were, according to South Africa, responses to
European and US violations of existing rules in the US system (Habib, 2011). In its current stint
in the Council, South Africa has again generated controversy from the international community.
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The country voted to pass a UN resolution authorizing the use of force in implementing a no-fly
zone over Libya, while Brazil, China, India, and Russia all abstained from the same vote. This
has generated concerns about South Africa’s foreign policies and the implications thereof for
BRICS as a political entity. The most recent divergence in foreign policy comes from South
Africa’s August 2011 opposition to unfreezing assets belonging to the fallen government of
Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and offering it to the rebels, along with the refusal to recognize
them as the legitimate government of the country. South Africa agreed to support a package for
$500 million package for humanitarian assistance but will not release funds until the UN has
recognized the National Transitional Council itself15 (Smith, 2011;Besada, Tok, Winters, 2013).
In its 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy, the government emphasizes
the role that resource-rich African countries can play in providing markets, while recognizing
that other countries on the continent will provide challenges in terms of competition for new
markets and political influence. The paper therefore calls for the need to develop partnerships
with countries on the continent for “mutual advancement” (Government of South Africa, 2011).
It rather directly indicates how any “African policy” on the continent is influenced by South
African economic and political interests, largely without emphasizing how the policies of South
Africa will be shaped by the needs of the greater region (Fabricus, 2011). Therefore, although
South Africa has often been labeled a “representative” of the African continent within the BRICS
group, its economic and political interests are not always aligned with those of its African
neighbors (OA, 2011).
Conclusion
Many of the challenges outlined in this essay constitute growing pains for the still
relatively new BRICS bloc. Over time, cohesion and teamwork will likely be the new reality, and
the BRICS entity will likely soon be offering up a formidable challenge to traditional Western
powers. Still, at the moment, the BRICS countries have not fulfilled their initial promise, and a
substantive assessment indicates that pessimism may be warranted. Given the evidence, four
concluding points can be made. First, the BRICS forum should be called what it is, not what it
could be: It is an economic cooperation forum, not a political cooperation forum, with
consequences for both global-Southern countries and global governance. The BRICS group’s
primary focus is on sector cooperation in trade and investment. Political and foreign policy
objectives of member nations do not converge and, indeed, sometimes conflict. One of the best
examples of such lack of convergence is that South Africa has indicated that it would use the
BRICS grouping to intensify the global campaign against climate change, but this objective
clashes with other members’ energy and development plans. Second, it can be concluded that
analysts’ other claims (like BRICS being an alternative to NATO) are farfetched, since the
evident focus of BRICS is trade and investment, and a military threat to BRICS countries from
NATO is not imminent. If sector cooperation is narrow, interests are not in fact common, and
foreign policy instruments are diverse, global development will continue to be uneven, the
bargaining power of Southern countries will not be increased, and what should be a dual strategic
alliance and platform for cooperation will instead likely become a forum that can be readily
instrumentalized for unilateral national political gain.
Still—and third among the concluding points—the implication for South Africa (and, more
broadly, Africa acting through South Africa) is that the BRICS grouping could, in Zuma’s
words, be treated as a “gateway” to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, from which the country and
continent could gain much needed infrastructure investment, with whom South Africa and the
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continent could participate in enriching education exchange, and from whom both the country
and the continent could acquire technology transfers that could revolutionize Africa’s tertiary
sector (if complementary government policies are put in place). South Africa can instrumentalize
the BRICS grouping to secure such things for Africa, and it can perhaps do so through
institutionalization of the forum, particularly establishing policies and frameworks like those of
the G20 as well as a monitoring mechanism, such as the economic surveys and country
surveillance conducted by the OECD. Fourth, it should be concluded that like other countries,
South Africa can instrumentalize the forum for its own needs. While it does so, South Africa
should also focus on continent-wide integration through the African Union, which could act as a
counter-weight to the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
At this time, academics and researchers have a role to play going forward. Academics
should develop and monitor the policies of the BRICS group. As the concept of soft balancing
has demonstrated, contemporary informal alliances, coalitions, and cooperative arrangements, in
whatever form they take, have wide-ranging implications for many countries that may otherwise
come undone through violence and revolution. Universities should begin tracking the
commitments and achievements of the BRICS form (just as the University of Toronto tracks the
commitments and achievements of the G20)16 in lieu of an official monitoring mechanism in
order to provide data and perspectives for state and non-state actors such as civil society
organizations to use in lobbying BRICS governments ahead of summits. Together with
assertiveness by South Africa, such developments could facilitate and accelerate change away
from the status quo.
1

Both Hany Besada and Evren Tok are Project and Lead-Project-Investigators on Qatar Foundation’s National
Priorities Research Program- NPRP 6-1272-5-160
2
Although South Africa had a much slower annual growth rate in the 2010s than did the other BRICS members, its
rate of growth in 2010 was not as far behind as it was throughout the decade, ringing in at 2.5 percent in 2010
(compared to 7.8 percent for China, 3.2 percent for India, and 0.9 percent for Brazil). Despite this relative gain,
South Africa must still challenge itself to generate more inclusive growth in the country, raise GDP growth to 6–7
percent, and tackle high unemployment.
3
South Africa’s GNI per capita (purchasing power parity) is US$11,190, while China’s is US$9,210, India’s is
US$3,840, Russia’s is US$22,760 and Brazil’s is US$11,720 (World Bank, 2012).
4
2012 figure (See World Bank Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD)
5
Unemployment fell steadily from 2002 through 2007, but never dropped below 22 percent (World Bank, 2012). By
the first quarter of 2010, it again surpassed 25 percent. With low rates of labour force participation and a large
number of job seekers not formally counted among the unemployed, the unemployment figure is considered to be
above 30 percent and is most evident among black youth who face a rate exceeding 50 percent (OECD, 2010).
6
The two nations committed to cooperate on infrastructure construction projects, such as roads, railways, ports,
power generation, airports and housing. They also agreed to work together in such areas as defense, cultural
exchange, education, health, aquaculture, agriculture, transportation, civil aviation, science and technology, mineral
resources, information communications, tourism and personnel exchange sectors (Xinhua, August 24, 2010).
7
In dollars, however, bilateral SSA trade with China is four times that of trade with South Africa (Deutche Bank,
2011).
8
Matla Innovations, the first diamond-cutting and polishing plant opened in the Eastern Cape, a joint venture
between a Chinese and a South African company (Faurie, 2010). South Africa’s Women Investment Portfolio
Holdings and limestone miner Continental Cement and the China-Africa Development Fund and Jidong
Development Group entered into a joint venture to build a R1.65-billion cement manufacturing plant in Limpopo
province (SA.info, 2010). Tata Motors South Africa, a joint venture, between India's Tata Motors and Tata Africa,
opened a 100-million-rand truck assembly plant outside Pretoria in July 2011 (China Daily, 2011b). China’s
Ganzhou Qiandong Rare Earth Group also entered into a joint venture in July to build a rare earth processing plant
in South Africa’s Western Cape province with Great Western Minerals Group of Canada, which had bought out its
South African partner a few months earlier (Knowledge @ wharton Today, 2011).
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Qobo and Soko (2011) identify several conflicting policies and interests among the BRICS partnerships: economic
competition between China and India, China's campaign against India's bid for United Nation Security Council
permanent membership, China's historical alliance with Pakistan, and unresolved border disputes between Beijing
and Delhi.
10
The agreement was signed in 2004 and was signed without consulting BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
Swaziland) SACU partners – a disregard of the SACU treaty stipulating that all such agreements must be approved
by SACU members. It covers approximately 90% of bilateral trade between the two partners.
11
South Africa's support for normalised nuclear trade with India has attracted attention, a policy viewed as contrary
to the letter and the spirit of the Pelindaba Treaty, establishing Africa as a nuclear-weapons-free zone:
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-25-an-armchair-guide-to-sas-foreign-policy-challenges.
12
South Africa tried to weaken the resolution, but it did not understood UN protocol, dictating that if a country
intervenes in the drafting of a resolution, it cannot vote against the resolution or abstain from voting. Russia and
China voted in favour.
13
China and Russia also voted against the resolution.
14
In this instance Russia and China vetoed the resolution calling the deteriorating situation in Burma a serious risk
to regional peace.
15
The de-facto government of Libya during and following the end of the civil war. It remained in place for 10
months following the end of the civil war until a new elected assembly was sworn in on August 8, 2012.
16
See http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/ for more information.
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